NOTES
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF INFORMAL
ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING
In the last few weeks of its 1982 term, the Supreme Court of the
United States handed down a decision that will have a major impact on
administrative law. In Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Association v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,1 commonly known as

the "air bag" case, the Supreme Court apparently reconfirmed the
propriety of federal courts taking a "hard look" at agencies' informal
promulgation and rescission of rules.

Informal rulemaking today plays a major role in the
administrative process. "[T]he crush of increased responsibilities and
the burdens of trial-type hearings have led. . . federal agencies to turn
from case-by-case adjudication to general rulemaking proceedings in

order to develop administrative policy."'2 Congress and the courts have
recognized the utility of informal rulemaking and have provided that
in many instances agencies should be free to make rules without the
strictures of the formal hearing process.3 In the past, courts seldom
intruded upon informal rulemaking and when they did intrude, they
did so with great deference to agency findings. 4 But a different trend
has recently emerged: "widespread recognition that agencies exercise

broad lawmaking discretion, together with mounting distrust of the
1. 103 S.Ct. 2856 (1983).
2. Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1805, 1811 (1978); see, e.g., Note, The Use of Generic Rulemaking to Resolve Environmental
Issues in Nuclear Power PlantLicensing, 61 VA. L. REV. 869 (1975).
3. See United States v. Florida E.C. Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973)(clear expression of
congressional intent to require formal rulemaking necessary before courts should restrain agencies
from using informal procedures); see also infra notes 17-28 and accompanying text.
4. See Delong, Informal Rulemaking andthe IntegrationofLaw and Policy, 65 VA. L. REv.
257, 276 & n.1 11(1979); K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEvENrIEs § 29.01-1, at 655
(1976)(commenting that his four volume treatise in 1958 cited only four cases ofjudicial review of
informal rulemaking); see, e.g., Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935).
One reason for this lack of judicial activity was that only in the past few decades have
administrative agencies actively used their rulemaking powers. As Professors Gellhorn and
Robinson note in Rulemaking "Due Process An Inconclusive Dialogue, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 201,
203 (1981), it was not until 1956, in United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956),
that the Supreme Court confirmed the authority of an agency to use rulemaking to determine

issues of agency policy.
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wisdom and fairness of agency decisionmaking, have led courts to
exercise more exacting scrutiny of the factual and analytical bases of
' '5
such decisions.
Yet the propriety of and the limits to judicial scrutiny of informal
administrative rulemaking are by no means clear. Section 706(2)(A) of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)6 prescribes the "arbitrary and
capricious" test as the basic standard of review of informal rulemaking.
In several cases since 1971, the Supreme Court has attempted to
interpret the meaning of Congress's rather vague guidelines for judicial
review. State Farm is the latest in a line of cases that begins with
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe 7 and continues with
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. 8 in which the Court has sought to define an acceptable
standard of review of informal agency action. Each of these cases
contributes to the definition of the proper role of the federal courts in
reviewing administrative action. None, however, completely clarifies
the issue.
This note discusses the questions left unresolved by the early
Supreme Court decisions 9 and analyzes how the lower courts and
commentators have responded to the Court's ambiguous directives,
especially those contained in Vermont Yankee.' 0 It then describes the
holding and background of State Farm and comments on the case's
2
implications for administrative law.'
I.

INFORMAL RULEMAKING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

If its enabling statute so indicates, an agency may establish policies
through either adjudication or rulemaking.' 3 The APA specifies the
procedures for formal adjudication,"4 formal rulemaking,' 5 and infor5. Stewart, supra note 2, at 1811; see also Delong, supra note 4, at 277-82; McGowan,
Reflections on Rulemaking Review, 53 TUL. L. REv. 681 (1979).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
7. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
8. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). These cases are discussed infra at text accompanying notes 25-59.
9. See infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 60-82 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 83-146 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 147-71 and accompanying text.
13. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332
U.S. 194, 201-03 (1947); National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 692-98 (D.C.
Cir. 1973)(reversing lower court's determination that FTC Act did not authorize substantive
rulemaking), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
14. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557 (1982).
15. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556, 557 (1982).
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mal rulemaking.1 6 Many agencies have largely abandoned the use of
formal proceedings and have increasingly come to rely on informal or
"notice and comment" rulemaking to accomplish congressional
17
objectives.
The APA requires only minimal procedures for informal rulemaking.' 8 Once an agency develops a proposed rule, it must publish a notice of the proposed rulemaking in the FederalRegister. x9 Interested

persons then have the opportunity to comment on the proposed rule in
writing by submitting data, views, or argument. Agencies also may, at
their discretion, allow oral presentations. 20 After considering the relevant comments and other materials, if the agency decides to go ahead
with the rule, it must provide a concise statement of basis and purpose

to accompany the final rules.2' The final rule may differ from the proposed rule if the agency provided adequate notice of the general subject
to potential participants. 22 In contrast to the trial-type procedures required for formal adjudication and formal rulemaking, the procedures
that agencies employ in informal rulemaking are more like those used
23
by a legislative body.
A.

Overton Park: The Evolving Scope of JudicialReview of
Informal Agency Action.

Congress did not specify in the APA the precise standard appropriate for judicial review of informal rulemaking. Instead it simply
16. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
17. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES 167-69 (1976); Shapiro, The Choice ofRulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78

HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965).
18. See, e.g., Delong, supra note 4, at 258-60.

19. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982). The notice must give the time, place, and nature of the proceedings, the legal authority under which the rule is proposed, and either the substance of the
proposed rule or a description of the issues involved. The courts have elaborated on the necessary
content of the notice. See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393-95 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1251-63 (D.C. Cir.
1973). See generally K. DAVIs, supra note 17, at 172.
20. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982).
21. Id. This statement must indicate the issues considered by the agency and the agency's
disposition of those issues. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393-95 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
22. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 48 (D.C. Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976); California Citizens Board Ass'n v. United States, 375 F.2d 43, 48-49 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 844 (1967).
23. The APA contains no explicit procedures for informal adjudication, so if an adjudication
is not "required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing," 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982), or required by the due process clause to be on the record, see Wong
Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50-51 (1950), the applicable procedures are those specified by
statute or provided in the agency's discretion.
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provided one section dealing with the "scope of review." 24 In 5 U.S.C.

§ 706, Congress instructed the courts to set aside agency action that
fails to meet certain standards. Courts apply different standards under
the statute's hierarchy depending on the type of agency action being

reviewed. Courts conduct their most intrusive review when they examine certain types of agency findings "de novo"; 25 they review "for-

mal" agency actions under the somewhat less vigorous "substantial
evidence" standard. 26 Courts review all other agency actions that are
subject to review under the arbitrary and capricious test 27 and several
other statutory criteria designed to ensure that the agency observed
proper procedures and did not act ultra vires or in violation of the

Constitution.

28

Although courts usually have little difficulty deciding which of the

APA's standards to apply in a given case, they frequently disagree as to
what a particular standard means. Thus, courts seem to apply varying
scopes of review even though they are applying the same statutory stan-

dard of review. For many years, both before and after the APA was
enacted, courts reviewed informal agency rulemaking by considering
only whether the agency had a rational basis for the disputed rule and
29
whether the agency had statutory authority to promulgate the rule.

In practice, such review proved even more deferential than the current
arbitrary and capricious standard.
In the 1970's, the Supreme Court addressed the scope of review
question in two major decisions. The first, Citizens to Preserve Overton

Park,Inc. v. Volpe, 30 dealt specifically with informal adjudications, but
the Court's language applies to informal rulemaking as well. 31 In Over24. The primary questions that this section raises in informal rulemaking are whether the
"substantial evidence" standard or the arbitrary and capricious test applies to informal actions,
and the more difficult question of what is meant by those standards.
25. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.00-1 (1982 Supp.).
26. Id
27. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 143 (1967)(the substantial evidence test
provides for "considerably more generous judicial review than the 'arbitrary and capricious'
test").
28. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B)-(D) (1982).
29. See, e.g., United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371 (1940); Superior Oil Co. v.
FPC, 322 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 922 (1964).
30. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
31. The Court also decided Camp v. Pitts two years after Overton Park. In Camp, 411 U.S.
138 (1973)(per curiam), the Court reiterated that the appropriate standard of review was the arbitrary and capricious test. The per curiam opinion stated that courts were not free to hold de novo
hearings when a "contemporaneous explanation of the agency decision" was available. 411 U.S.
at 142-43. In applying the arbitrary and capricious standard, "the focal point for judicial review
should be the administrative record already in existence [and the validity of the agency's] action
must, therefore, stand or fall on the propriety of that finding." Id In Camp, the "contemporaneous explanation" was a single letter to the applicant. Although it did not clarify the standard,
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ton Park the Court held that the appropriate standard of review of
informal actions was the "arbitrary and capricious" test of section
706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act.
To make this finding the court must consider whether the decision
was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether
there has been a clear error of'judgment .... Although this inquiry
into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of
is not empowered to substitute its
review is a narrow one. The court
32
judgment for that of the agency.

But the Overton Park Court did remand the case to the lower court for
a "thorough, probing, in-depth review" of the administrative record
that was the basis for the Secretary of Transportation's decision.33 By
requiring a "hard look" at the administrative record, the Court specified that the arbitrary and capricious test should apply, but equated
that standard with the "clear error of judgment" or "clearly erroneous"
standard. 34 Instead of seeking a mere "rational basis" for agency actions, the Supreme Court mandated that courts examine the agency
record, and that agencies build a record to facilitate such review. In so
doing, the Court "revolutionized the concept of judicial review of in35
formal action."
Lower federal courts responded to the "somewhat Delphic opin36
ion" in Overton Park in a number of ways. 37 First, many courts attempted to elaborate the implications of the arbitrary and capricious
38
standard and to distinguish it from the "substantial evidence" test.
Although some federal appellate courts have perceived a distinction
between the two standards,39 other courts of appeals concluded that the
Camp did make clear that the standard to be applied was the arbitrary and capricious test and
that judicial review under that standard was to be based on the administrative record, not on
evidence adduced at a judicial trial. See id at 141-43.
32. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416 (citations omitted).
33. Id. The Court noted that "the Secretary's decision is entitled to a presumption of regularity." Id. at 415.
34. K. DAvis, supra note 25, at § 29.00 (1982 Supp.).
35. Verkuil, JudicialReview of Informal Rulemaking: Waitingfor Vermont Yankee II, 55
TUL. L. REv. 418, 422 (1981).
36. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
37. See McMillan & Peterson, The Permissible Scope of Hearings,Discovery, andAdditional
FacqndingDuring JudicialReview oflnformal.4gencyAction, 1982 DUKE L.J. 333.
38. The Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence as "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); see also L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRArIvE
ACTION 596 (1965)("for reasonable mind we must substitute reasoning mind").
39. On different occasions courts of appeals have called the arbitrary and capricious standard
an undemanding one, Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34 n.74 (D.C. Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 941 (1976), and "the far less demanding one," Action for Children's Television v. FCC,
564 F.2d 458, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1977), in comparison to the "possibly stricter standard" of substantial
evidence, Automobile Club of New York, Inc. v. Cox, 592 F.2d 658, 664 (2d Cir. 1979). See also
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distinction is largely semantic. 40 Judge J. Skelly Wright notes an

"emerging consensus of the Courts of Appeals that the distinction between the arbitrary and capricious standard and substantial evidence

review is largely semantic, and that 'in the review of rules of general
applicability made after notice and comment rulemaking, the two criteria [do] tend to converge.' "41

No matter what their views on the distinction between the two criteria, most courts of appeals construed the arbitrary and capricious
standard as one that requires the courts to take a "hard look" at the
agency decision. 42 The lower courts interpreted the Supreme Court's
comments in Overton Park,that review of the agency record on appeal
Judge J. Skelly Wright's views expressed in The Courts andthe RulemakingProcess: The Limits of
JudicialReview, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 391 (1974): "The reviewing court [under the arbitrary
and capricious standard] is not even authorized to examine whether a rulemaker's empirical conclusions have support in substantial evidence."
40. Judges on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit state: "While we still
have a feeling that there may be cases where an adjudicative determination not supported by
substantial evidence. . . would not be regarded as arbitrary or capricious,. . . in the review of
rules of general applicability made after notice and comment rulemaking, the two criteria do tend
to converge," Associated Indus. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 349-50 (2d Cir.
1973)(Friendly, J.); and "[Wlhen an agency engages in substantive rule-making, it abuses its discretion (or acts arbitrarily and capriciously) if its actions are not supported by substantial evidence." National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 705 (2d Cir.
1975)(Lumbard, J., concurring in the result).
Justice Frankfurter recognized this issue three decades ago: "Want of certainty in judicial
review. . . partly reflects the intractability of any formula to furnish definitions of content for all
the impalpable factors involved in judicial review." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474, 477 (1951). See generally K. DAvis, supra note 25, at § 29.00-1; K. DAvis, supra note 4, at
§ 29.00; Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1313 (1975). Justice Linde of
the Arizona Supreme Court states:
Existing statutory and judicial formulations for reviewing the exercise of discretion are
among the most unsatisfactory in the area of judicial review of agency action. Words
such as "arbitrary," "capricious," or "abuse of discretion," state conclusions, not premises from which a conclusion may be derived. When a statute or a line of precedents
instructs a reviewing court to set aside action found to be arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion, it merely provides the terms in which the conclusion of invalidity
may be pronounced. These terms do nothing to articulate the process of analysis by
which the issue of invalidity is to be litigated and decided.
Brodie & Linde, State CourtReview ofAdministrativeAction: Prescribingthe Scope of Review, 1977
ARiz. ST. L.J. 537, 550.
41. Pacific Legal Found. v. DOT, 593 F.2d 1338, 1343 n.35 (D.C. Cir.) (quoting Associated
Indus. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 349-50 (2d Cir. 1973)), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
830 (1979).
42. The "hard look" concept is usually traced back to Judge Harold Leventhal's opinion in
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
923 (1971): "Its supervisory function calls on the court to intervene . . .if the court becomes
aware. . . that the agency has not really taken a 'hard look' at the salient problems, and has not
genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making." See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus,
486 F.2d at 394 ("a continuing duty to take a 'hard look' "); see also Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427
U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976)(courts must ensure agency has taken "hard look").
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should be "thorough, probing, in-depth," 43 as requiring close scrutiny
of agency decisionmaking. After Overton Park, the courts of appeals

embarked on a course of rigorous review that demanded a complete

agency record and reasoned agency decisionmaking. 44
Courts demanded a complete record from the agency because of
the Supreme Court's directive in both Overton Park4 5 and Camp v.
Pitts46 that judicial review should be based almost entirely on the ad-

ministrative record. The requirement of reasoned decisionmaking, including an articulation by the agency of its response to criticism and
contrary evidence, when linked to courts' threats to remand to the
agency, had the effect of inducing the agencies to institute more elaborate procedures so that the record demonstrated a "thorough ventila-

tion of the issues."'47 The courts of appeals' actions effectively reformed
the structure of informal rulemaking by engrafting formal procedures
and created a "hybrid rulemaking" process. 48 The result of these imposed procedures was a "paper hearing"-a midpoint on the contin-

uum between informal notice and comment rulemaking and formal
trial-type procedures.
43. 401 U.S. at 415; see, e.g., Pacific Legal Found. v. DOT, 593 F.2d 1338, 1343 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979).
44. Professor Rodgers suggests that there are three essential ingredients of the hard look
doctrine:
First is the substantive component, under which the courts read closely the operative
statute to make sure the agencies stay within the scope of discretion assigned by Congress. Second is the procedural component, under which the courts have assumed a
power to oversee the fairness of agency decisionmaking ...
Third, and most important, is the incessant demand of the hard look case law for
reasoned decisionmaking .... Under the doctrine, assumptions must be spelled out,
inconsistencies explained, methodologies disclosed, contradictory evidence rebutted, record references solidly grounded, guesswork eliminated and conclusions supported in a
"manner capable of judicial understanding."
Rodgers, A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEO.
L.J. 699, 705-06 (1979)(footnote omitted)(quoting E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541
F.2d 1018, 1038 (4th Cir. 1976), a§'d in part and rev'd in part, 430 U.S. 112 (1977)).
45. 401 U.S. at 415.
46. 411 U.S. 138, 140 (1973)(per curiam).
47. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
rev'd sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978); see Stewart, The Development ofAdministrative and Quasi-Constitutional
Law in JudicialReview ofEnvironmentalDecisionmaking: Lessonsfrom the Clean AirAct, 62 IOWA
L. REV. 713 (1977).
48. For discussions of hybrid rulemaking and relevant cases, see DeLong, supra note 4, at
260 n.22; Nathanson, Probingthe Mind ofthe Administrator: Hearing Variationsand Standardsof
JudicialReview Under the Administrative ProcedureAct and Other FederalStatutes, 75 COLUM. L.
REv. 721 (1975); Stewart, supra note 2; Williams, Hybrid Rulemaking Under the Administrative
ProcedureAct:A Legal andEmpiricalAnalysis, 42 U. CHI. L. RaV. 401 (1975); Note, The Judicial
Role in Dgining ProceduralRequirementsforAgency Rulemaking, 87 HARV. L. REV.782 (1974).
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Vermont Yankee: RestrainingJudicialReview of Informal
Agency Actions.

The Supreme Court decided the second major scope of review
case, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc., in 1978. In Vermont Yankee the Court tempered
the lower courts' eagerness to impose new procedural requirements

upon the agencies in informal actions. The unanimous Court49 reversed the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit which, the Supreme Court concluded, had rested its decision 50
remanding an order granting an operating license on the "inadequacy
of the procedures employed in the procedings." 5 1 The Court held that

to impose "hybrid" rulemaking procedures was wrong-absent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances "the administrative agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure

and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous duties. ' 52 The Court rejected the contention that the APA merely establishes minimum procedures that a court
53
may supplement when issues of "Great Public Import" are involved.

The Court said that the legislative history of the APA as well as policy
considerations militated against such judicial requirement of extra procedural devices.5 4 The Court remanded the case so that the Court of
49. Justices Blackmun and Powell took no part in the decision. 435 U.S. at 558.
50. Natural Resources Defenses Council, Inc., v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
51. 435 U.S. at 539.
52. Id at 543 (quoting FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965));seealso FCC v. Pottsville
Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 (1940).
53. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 545.
54. Id. at 546-48.
Congress intended that the discretion of the agencies and not that of the courts be exercised.. . . There are compelling reasons for construing [the APA] in this manner[:] In
the first place, if courts continually review agency proceedings to determine whether the
agency employed procedures which were, in the court's opinion, perfectly tailored to
reach what the court perceives to be the "best" or "correct" result, judicial review would
be totally unpredictable. And the agencies, operating under this vague injunction to
employ the "best" procedures and facing the threat of reversal if they did not, would
undoubtedly adopt full adjudicatory procedures in every instance ...
Secondly, it is obvious that the court in these cases reviewed the agency's choice of
procedures on the basis of the record actually produced at the hearing, and not on the
basis of the information available to the agency when it made the decision to structure
the proceedings in a certain way. This sort of Monday morning quarterbacking not only
encourages but almost compels the agency to conduct all rulemaking proceedings with
the full panoply of procedural devices normally associated only with adjudicatory
hearings.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this sort of review fundamentally misconceives the nature of the standard for judicial review of an agency rule. The court below
uncritically assumed that additional procedures will automatically result in a more adequate record because it will give interested parties more of an opportunity to participate
and contribute to the proceedings. But informal rulemaking need not be based solely on
the transcript of a hearing held before an agency. . . . In sum, this sort of unwarranted
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Appeals could determine whether the agency record was sufficient to
55
uphold the agency's decision.
Courts and commentators 56 exhibited a mixed reaction to the Vermont Yankee decision. Some commentators applauded the Court's
reprimand to the lower courts for going beyond statutorily mandated
procedures and changing informal rulemaking into a cumbersome, formalized process.5 7 Many commentators, however, were highly critical
of the Court's attempt to stop the development of the administrative
"common law," and charged that Vermont Yankee misinterpreted the
APA and its legislative history and ignored the realities of the administrative process.5 8 Some courts interpreted Vermont Yankee to require a
highly deferential approach to review of agency action while others
seemed to prove prescient the idea advanced by Justice Stewart that
Vermont Yankee "might have the salutary side effect of leading reviewing courts to engage in more open and explicit scrutiny of substantive
59
agency policies, rather than resorting to indirect procedural devices."
One of the best examples of the deference prompted by Vermont
Yankee can be seen in Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC, a 1982
decision of a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.60 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
judicial examination of perceived procedural shortcomings of a rulemaking proceeding
can do nothing but seriously interfere with that process prescribed by Congress.
Id. (emphasis in original).
55. Id at 549.
56. See generally Barr,JudicialReview ofInformalRulemaking Procedure: When May Something More Formalbe Required?, 27 AM. U.L. REV. 781 (1978); Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the
Courts' Role in the Nuclear Energy Controversy, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1833 (1978); Byse, Vermont
Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure: A Somewhat Different View, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1823 (1978); Davis, Administrative Common Law and the Vermont Yankee Opinion, 1980
UTAH L. REV. 3; McGowan, supra note 5; Nathanson, The Vermont Yankee NuclearPower Opinion: A Masterpiece of Statutory Misinterpretation, 16 SAN DiEGo L. REV. 183 (1979); Rodgers,
supra note 44; Scalia, Vermont Yankee, the AP.A, the D. C. Circuit Court, and the Supreme Court,
1978 Sup. CT. REV. 345; Stewart, supra note 2; Verkuil, supra note 35; Comment, CounterRevolution in the FederalCourtsofAppeals-The Aftermath of Vermont Yankee, 15 U. RICH. L. REV.723
(1981).
57. See, e.g., Byse, supra note 56; Breyer, supra note 56. But see Verkuil, supra note 35, at
419 ("If the Court is serious about preserving the outcome of Vermont Yankee, it must add to its
procedural decision a substantial one, modifying the expansive scope of review standard that allows reviewing courts to build a record in informal proceedings. If the Court fails to add a second
decision to Vermont Yankee, it will have done very little to establish the primacy of agency control
over the rulemaking process.").
58. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 56; Nathanson, supra note 56. Several commentators suggested that the impact of the decision would be minimal or, indeed, would be to increase judicial
scrutiny of substantive matters. See Davis,supra note 56, at 15-17; Stewart, supra note 2, at 182022; see also K. DAvis, supra note 25, at 29.00-2 (Supp. 1982).
59. Stewart, supra note 2, at 1821.
60. 673 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 79 (1983).
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(NRC) promulgated a rule mandating a stringent fire protection program for nuclear power plants under its undisputed authority to engage
in notice and comment rulemaking to set safety standards. 61 Connecticut Light and Power, a company licensed by the Commission to operate nuclear generating plants, objected both to the procedures that the
62
NRC utilized in adopting the rule and to the substance of the rules.
The court of appeals upheld the NRC's decision, but did so reluctantly.63 Although highly deferential to the NRC's substantive determination, the court was less than satisfied with the procedures used:
We cannot conceal, however, our concerns about some of the procedures followed by the Commission in the rule-making process by
which the program was adopted. The Commission complied but
barely with the procedures mandated by the Administrative Procedure Act for notice and comment rule-making, 5 U.S.C. § 553
(1976) ....
At almost every step of the way, the NRC's procedures
were less than exemplary. The notice of proposed rule-making was
cursory and gave the industry the minimum acceptable opportunity
to respond. The agency's statement of the basis for the program in its
final form provided limited technical guidance indeed. . . . If the
NRC treats the safeguards of the administrative process in too cavalier a fashion . . . it may be impossible for the reviewing court
to
64
discern that its action has indeed furthered the public safety.
Notwithstanding the minimal procedural protections provided by the
NRC, the court, following the directive of Vermont Yankee, affirmed
65
the agency's rule.
But a number of courts read Vermont Yankee as limiting only procedural review, not review of substance or agency reasoning, and some
61. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2201(i), 5841(f) (1976).
62. Connecticut Light & Power, 673 F.2d at 527.
63. Id at 536.
64. Id at 528, 536-37.
65. Another example ofjudicial deference to informal agency action is seen in Home Health
Servs. of the United States, Inc. v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 353 (11 th Cir. 1982). The court upheld a
decision concerning medical provider costs made by the Provider Reimbursement Review Board
of the Department of Health and Human Services. The Board relied on several surveys whose
reliability the court (and even the Board) admitted was "questionable," 683 F.2d at 357, yet the
court deferred to the Board's judgment and upheld its decision. The court noted that the scope of
review was limited; under "this narrow standard of review, a court lacks the power to substitute its
judgment for that of the administrative agency. If the agency's findings are supported by substantial evidence and are not arbitrary or capricious, the reviewing court cannot reverse the findings of
the agency on the basis that it would have decided the case differently." 683 F.2d at 356-57.
Particularly after Vermont Yankee, several courts of appeals have appeared to give less than a
hard look to informal agency decisionmaking. See Rockford League of Women Voters v. NRC,
679 F.2d 1218, 1220-21 (7th Cir. 1982)(not only upholding agency inaction but also refusing to
scrutinize possible agency departure from settled course of action). But see Nueces County Navigation Dist. No. I v. ICC, 674 F.2d 1055, 1063-64 (5th Cir. 1982)(agency must adequately explain
departure from previous policy so that reviewing court may determine reasonableness of that
departure).
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judges suggested that Vermont Yankee mandated heightened judicial
scrutiny of the substance of agency rulemaking.6 6 In NaturalResources
Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 67 the case arising from the remand in
Vermont Yankee, Judge Bazelon wrote a lengthy and technical opinion 68 again vacating the NRC's rules concerning the lack of necessity
for individualized consideration of the environmental impact of the
reprocessing, storage, and disposal of spent nuclear fuel (the "back
end" of the fuel cycle). The court sifted through a mass of complex
technical data to conclude that the rule failed "to allow for consideration of uncertainties underlying [the Commission's] assumption that no
radiological effluents will be released into the biosphere once wastes are
69
sealed in a permanent repository" (the "zero release" assumption).
The court found that the rule was not based on a "consideration of the
relevant factors"-the "health, socioeconomic, and cumulative effects
7
of fuel-cycle activities" 7 0-and was thus arbitrary and capricious. '
66. See, for example, the comments of Judge McGowan:
In informal rulemaking, as elsewhere, fair procedures tend to assume fair results; and a
reviewing court that rigidly insists upon the one can, for that very reason, be justifiably
less exacting in its scrutiny of the other.
It is for this reason that I view with some apprehension the Supreme Court's ban in
Vermont Yankee on judicially directed expansion, on occasion, of the APA's requirements for informal rulemaking. Its consequence may be that courts, deprived of this
resource, may feel compelled, at the substantive review level, to probe more deeply into
the scientific and technical matters in respect of which they have very limited competence at best, with the risk of thereby frustrating the work of the experts into whose care
those matters have been given.
McGowan, supra note 5, at 695.
67. 685 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 103 S.Ct. 2246 (1983). The Supreme Court held that the Court of
Appeals had gone beyond its proper role of assuring that the agency had adequately considered
the environmental impact of its action and suggested that courts should leave the "fundamental
policy question" of nuclear power development to the Congress. Baltimore Gas & Elec., 103 S. Ct.
at 2252.
68. It is even more striking that this "substantive review" opinion was written by Judge
Bazelon, whose pre-Vermont Yankee stance on strict procedural review rested upon "his conclusion that judges are 'institutionally incompetent' to weigh evidence, even to make an 'arbitrary
and capricious' determination, in rulemaking proceedings involving highly technical and complex
areas." Raymond, A Vermont Yankee in King Burger's Court: Constraints on Judicial Review
Under NEP4, 7 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 629, 642 (1979)(citations omitted). Before Vermont
Yankee, Judge Bazelon had made clear that "judicial review of technical agency decisions ought
to concentrate on procedures, not the merits." Rodgers, supra note 44, at 713.
69. 685 F.2d at 477.
70. Id. at 494.
71. Id. at 485 (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281,
285 (1974)). The court also concluded that the NRC's failure to disclose the uncertainties of the
zero release assumption violated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42
U.S.C. § 4332 (1976), and was therefore "not in accordance with law" as required under section
706(2)(A) of the APA, 685 F.2d at 489. Judge Wilkey, who dissented, accused the majority of
ignoring
clear directions to the contrary from the Supreme Court [in Vermont Yankee and of
applying a standard that is] best described as requiring "too hard a look." . . . Judge
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Unlike the NaturalResources Defense Council case, which struck
down a generic rule after the agency had reached a reasoned decision
because the court disagreed with the results, other courts have closely
scrutinized agencies' decisionmaking processes to ensure that the agen-

cies have presented well-reasoned and well-articulated explanations of
their actions. Without such an explanation, a reviewing court cannot
effectively exercise its responsibility to oversee agency action. 72 This

approach, of course, circumvents the kind of case-by-case judicial creation of hybrid rulemaking procedures that the Court denounced in Vermont Yankee. Yet this approach may have the same effect as hybrid
procedures, because the threat of remand for a "clearer explanation"

often prompts the agency to employ additional procedures to develop
further its records in case of appeal and review.
Effects analogous to hybrid rulemaking were apparent in the chal-

lenge to the Federal Communication Commission's decision to renew
the license of a television station in CentralFloridaEnterprisesv. FCC

(CentralFlorida])73 in which the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit vacated the FCC's decision. The court held that the

FCC inadequately investigated and analyzed certain factors weighing
against the renewal and had not "even vaguely described" the process

by which it weighed those factors. 74 The court stated that "the Commission's handling of the facts of this case [made it] embarrassingly
clear that the FCC practically erected a presumption of renewal that is
inconsistent with the full hearing requirement" 7 5 of the Communications Act. 76 The court remanded the case to the agency with instructions to the FCC to cure those deficiencies.
Bazelon's majority opinion has braided from NEPA, the APA, and his own perceptions
of public good a novel standard of substantive and procedural scrutiny of NRC activity
which we as a court are unauthorized to create and ill-equipped to manage.
685 F.2d at 517 (Vilkey, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court apparently agreed with Judge
Wilkey and reversed the majority.
72. Judge Wald summed up this view as follows:
Collectively, these concerns have sometimes been expressed as a need for "reasoned decision-making" and sometimes as a need for adequate "methodology." However expressed, these more substantive concerns have been coupled with a requirement that
assumptions be stated, that process be revealed, that the rejection of alternate theories or
abandonment of alternate courses of action be explained and that the rationale for the
ultimate decision be set forth in a manner which permits the public to exercise its statutory prerogative of comment and the courts to exercise their statutory responsibility upon
review.
National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(footnotes omitted); see also Recording Indus. Ass'n v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 662 F.2d 1, 7-11 (1981).
73. 598 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cer. dismissed, 411 U.S. 957 (1979).
74. 598 F.2d at 50.
75. Id at 51.
76. 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1976).
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On remand the FCC again concluded that the license should be
renewed and its conclusion was again appealed to the Court of Appeals. 77 This time the court affirmed the Commission's decision, holding that the prior inadequate fact-finding and analysis and faulty
balancing methodology had been cured. 78 The FCC had assuaged the
court's concern that its analysis was too cursory and had also adopted a
new policy for renewal proceedings that met the criteria of CentralFlorida I. Nevertheless, the court carefully scrutinized the FCC's new approach and specified the factors that it expected the FCC to consider in
future renewal proceedings so that the "new approach [would not] degenerate into precisely the sort of irrebuttable presumption in favor of
renewal that we have warned against. ' 79 The court noted that "much
will depend on how the Commission applies [the new standard] and
fleshes it out," and subtly reminded the FCC that remand would be
available to correct a decision "'opaque to judicial review,' 'wholly
unintelligible,' or based purely on 'administrative "feel." ' "580
Thus the court avoided stepping over the line drawn in Vermont
Yankee by requiring a clearly articulated and well-reasoned decision
yet not specifying any "hybrid" procedures. In so doing, the Central
Florida court compelled an agency to develop its own additional, more
formal procedures so that it could produce an acceptable record for
review. Other courts also utilized this elaboration approach to ensure
that judicial review would remain an effective check on improper
agency power. 8' This was also at least partially the approach taken by
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in invalidating a rescission by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) of the requirement for passive restraints in many cars, a decision upheld by the Supreme Court. 2 That case placed squarely
before the Court the question whether the elaboration approach to judicial review of informal administrative action-a requirement of reasoned decisionmaking evident from the record-was permissible.
77. Central Florida Enters. v. FCC (CentralFloridaII), 683 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S.Ct. 1774 (1983).
78. 683 F.2d at 505.
79. Id at 508.
80. Id (footnotes omitted)(quoting CentralFloridaI, 598 F.2d at 50, 59).
81. See Greyhound Corp. v. ICC, 668 F.2d 1354, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1981)(vacating agency's
action for failure to explain adequately its rejection of one test and its substitution of another as
sole criterion for continuing jurisdiction); Illinois v. United States, 666 F.2d 1066, 1074-75 (7th
Cir. 1981)(agency must fully explain why final decision differs from that of factfinder).
82. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. DOT, 680 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1982), vacated and
remandedsub nom. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 S.Ct. 2856
(1983).
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M: LEGITIMIZING HARD LOOK REVIEW

In 1966, in response to increasing concern about the deaths and
injuries resulting from motor vehicle accidents 8 3 and recognizing the
need for expertise in seeking solutions, Congress enacted the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act8 4 for the purpose of reducing
"traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents." 85 The Act created the National Highway Transportation
Safety Administration (NHTSA) and gave it authority to issue safety
regulations. One of the NHTSA's regulations, the passive restraint requirement, was at issue in State Farm. This regulation had a long,
"complex and convoluted history. Over the course of approximately 60
rulemaking notices, the requirement [had] been imposed, amended, re'86
scinded, reimposed, and now rescinded again."
In 1967, the Department of Transportation (DOT), parent agency
to the NHTSA, issued Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard Number
208, which required automobile manufacturers to install lap and shoulder belts in all new cars. 87 The DOT found, however, that automobile
83. In 1982, 46,300 Americans died in such accidents. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, 1982
MOTOR VEHICLE DEATHS BY STATES (May 16, 1983).
84. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1982)(hereinafter cited as "the Act").
85. 15 U.S.C. § 1381 (1982). Thus the NHTSA can act to prevent accidents and/or to prevent injuries in the event of accidents-especially those arising from the " 'second collision'-the
impact of the individual within the vehicle against the steering wheel, dashboard, windshield,
etc.-[which had] been largely neglected." S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprintedin
1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2709, 2710-11. The Act directs the Secretary of Transportation or his delegate (the Secretary's authority under the Act to promulgate safety standards has
been delegated to the Administrator of the NHTSA. 49 C.F.R. § 1.50(a) (1982)) to issue motor
vehicle safety standards that "shall be practicable, shall meet the need for motor vehicle safety,
and shall be stated in objective terms," 15 U.S.C. § 1392(a) (1982). In issuing these standards, the
Secretary is directed to consider "relevant available motor vehicle safety data," whether the proposed standard "is reasonable, practicable and appropriate" for the particular type of motor vehicle, and the "extent to which such standards will contribute to carrying out the purposes" of the
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(0(1), (3), (4) (1982). Although Congress intended that "safety shall be the
overriding consideration in the issuance of standards," it also recognized that the "Secretary will
necessarily consider reasonableness of cost, feasibility and adequate lead time." S. REP. No. 1301,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2709, 2714. The Act also
provides for judicial review under the provisions of section 706 of the APA of all "orders establishing, amending, or revoking a Federal motor vehicle safety standard." 15 U.S.C. § 1392(b)
(1982).
86. State Farm, 103 S.Ct. at 2862. That administrative history was accompanied by congressional activity and a good deal of litigation as well, including separate adjudications in both the
Sixth Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit. For a good overview of this history, see Graham & Gorham, NHTSA andPassive Restraints. A Case ofArbitrary and Capricious Deregulation,
35 AD. L. REV. 193 (1983); see also the first several pages of the opinions of both the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court, as well as Note, Seat Bells Anyone?-Deparment of Transportation Attempts to "Unbuckle" the Auto Industryfrom PassiveRestraint Requirements: State Farm v.
Department of Transportation, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 1091, 1130-36 (1983).
87. 32 Fed. Reg. 2408, 2415 (1967).
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passengers did not use these manual seatbelts enough to reduce injuries
significantly. Consequently, the agency issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking in July 1969 to consider a requirement for "passive restraint" systems, 88 protective systems that would require "no action by
vehicle occupants."8 9 After separate lengthy rulemaking proceedings,
the NHTSA in 1970 and 1971 issued revisions to Standard 208 which
called for installation of passive restraints--either airbags or "passive
belt" systems. 90
The 1972 version of Standard 208 called for "complete passive
protection" for all front seat occupants of vehicles manufactured after
August 15, 1975. 9 t Several automobile manufacturers challenged the
passive restraint requirements. In Chrysler Corp. v. DOT, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the NHTSA had
the statutory authority to mandate passive restraints and that the
"Agency's decision to require passive restraints is supported by substantial evidence. '92 The court held, however, that the compliance tests
did not satisfy the Safety Act's requirement that safety standards be
stated in "objective" terms 93 and remanded the passive restraint provisions to the NHTSA. Meanwhile, the interlock systems which car makers had installed were becoming highly unpopular among consumers
and in 1974 Congress prohibited NHTSA from enacting any standard
requiring or permitting compliance by means of interlocks or continu-

ous buzzers. 94 In addition, Congress provided for a legislative veto of
88. 34 Fed. Reg. 11,148 (1969).
89. 36 Fed. Reg. 8296 (1971); see Comment, Occupant Protectionin Automobiles-Airbags
and Other Passive Restraints: The State of the Art, The FederalStandardand Beyond, 27 AM. U.L.
REv. 635 (1978).
90. 35 Fed. Reg. 16,927, 16,928 (1970); 36 Fed. Reg. 12,858, 12,859, 12,866 (1971). "This rule
was a de facto airbag mandate since no other technologies were available to comply with the
standard." Graham & Gorham, supra note 86, at 197. "The airbag is an inflatable device concealed in the dashboard and steering column. It automatically inflates when a sensor indicates
that deceleration forces from an accident have exceeded a preset minimum, then rapidly deflates
to dissipate those forces." State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2862. However, in 1971 NHTSA recognized
that some "passive belt" systems might meet the requirements of Modified Standard 208 and
added a new section providing for passive belts, as long as "emergency release" mechanisms were
present. 36 Fed. Reg. 12,858, 12,859, 12,866 (1971).
91. The standard allowed compliance in the interim by either passive restraints or seat belts
coupled with "ignition interlock devices" that would prevent starting the vehicle if the belts were
not connected. 37 Fed. Reg. 3911 (1972). Most car manufacturers chose the interlock system. 41
Fed. Reg. 24,070 n.3 (1976)(only a few luxury GM cars were equipped with airbags).
92. 472 F.2d 659, 675 (6th Cir. 1972).
93. Id at 675-78.
94. The Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-492,
§ 109, 88 Stat. 1482, 15 U.S.C. § 1410(c)(1) (1982).
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any future standard that could be satisfied by any system other than
95
manual seatbelts.
The agency postponed the effective date for passive restraint systems to August 31, 1976 but emphasized that the delay was only temporary. 96 In June 1976, however, Secretary of Transportation William T.
Coleman initiated a new rulemaking on the issue 97 and decided to suspend the passive restraint requirement. In its place Coleman proposed
a large scale demonstration project involving up to a half a million
98
automobiles.
Brock Adams, appointed by Jimmy Carter to succeed Coleman as
Secretary of Transportation, did not agree that the demonstration project was necessary. He reopened rulemaking on the topic a few months
after assuming office 99 and soon issued a new mandatory passive restraint regulation to take effect beginning in 1981.100 Both airbags and
passive belts would satisfy the standard.
Once again, Modified Standard 208 was challenged in court and in
Congress. In Pacfic Legal Foundation v. DOT,10 ' the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld Modified
Standard 208 as a rational, nonarbitrary regulation within the agency's
authority. The court noted that Adams's policy was a clear departure
from the decision of Secretary Coleman but held that Adams had "provided a sufficient explanation why his judgment differed from his predecessor's."' 0 2 In Congress, although opposition surfaced, neither house
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1410b(c)(2) (1982). The House passed by a vote of 339-49 an amendment
that would have repealed the DOT's authority to require passive restraint systems but this provision was dropped by the conference committee in lieu of the legislative veto provision. Mandatory
Seatbelt System Voided, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 685-88 (1974).
96. 40 Fed. Reg. 33,977 (1975). "The NHTSA intends to propose the long-term requirements
for occupant crash protection . . . as soon as possible." Id

97. 41 Fed. Reg. 24,070 (1976).
98. Coleman, who found passive restraints economically and technically feasible, suspended
the mandatory standard because he expected widespread public opposition to it. DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, THE SECRETARY'S DECISION CONCERNING MOTOR VEHICLE OCCUPANT
CRASH PROTECTION 8, 10-12 (Dec. 6, 1976).

99. 43 Fed. Reg. 15,935 (1977).
100. 42 Fed. Reg. 34,289 (1977). Modified Standard 208 ordered a phasing in of passive restraints starting with large cars in 1982, mid-size cars in 1983, and small cars in 1984. Under the
NHTSA's assumptions, an estimated 9000 lives would be saved and 65,000 serious injuries would
be avoided annually. 42 Fed. Reg. 34,297-99 (1977).
101. 593 F.2d 1338, 1339-40 (D.C. Cir.)(Petitioner Pacific Legal Foundation opposed passive
restraints and asked the court to overturn the standard, while Petitioner Public Citizen wished to

accelerate the timetable for requiring installation of those restraints), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830
(1979).
102. 593 F.2d at 1346.
103. The full House of Representatives did not take any action on this matter. The Senate, on
committee recommendation, tabled a resolution of disapproval. 123 CONG. REC. 33,332 (1977).
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exercised its authority to veto the standard. 103 The car manufacturers,
albeit reluctantly, geared up to comply with the 1982 deadline.
The deadline for compliance was fast approaching when Ronald
Reagan appointed Drew Lewis as Secretary of Transportation. Within
a month after taking office, Lewis reopened the rulemaking process due
to drastically changed economic circumstances and particularly the
economic "difficulties of the automobile industry."' 0 4 In April, the

NHTSA granted car makers a one-year delay in complying with the
large car deadline and announced plans to reexamine the passive restraint issue with an eye towards possible rescission. 0 5 In October
1981 the NHTSA issued a final rule (Notice 25) that rescinded the passive restraint requirement of Modified Standard 208.106
A.

The Court of Appeals Decision in State Farm.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and the National Association of Independent Insurers filed petitions for review of
the NHTSA's decision to rescind Modified Standard 208. In State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Department of TransportaCongress did pass riders to DOT appropriations bills for 1979 and 1980 that prohibited the Department from spending funds to enforce the passive restraint requirements. See DOT and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-335, § 317, 92 Stat. 435, 450 (1978); DOT
& Related Agencies Approp. Act, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-131, § 317(a), 93 Stat. 1023, 1039 (1979).
Because the standard was not scheduled for implementation until 1981, the riders had only symbolic effect. Other proposals to modify the standard (particularly the "Stockman Amendment" of
1979 which would have required NHTSA to allow manual belts as a means to satisfy the requirement, 125 CONG. REC. 36,924-25 (Dec. 19, 1979)) failed to become law and Standard 208 remained in effect.
104. 46 Fed. Reg. 12,033 (1981). The action was in line with President Reagan's Executive
Order of February 17, which ordered agencies to suspend or postpone the effective date of all
major regulations that had not yet taken effect. A major regulation was defined as one likely to
have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R.
127, 131-32, § 7(a), 127, § 1(b)(1) (1982), reprintedin 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West Supp. 1983).
105. 46 Fed. Reg. 21,172, 21,205 (1981). The White House Press Office announced these decisions on April 6, 1981, as part of a larger package of economic recovery measures.
106. Id at 53,419. The agency maintained that it no longer could find that the passive restraint requirement would produce significant safety benefits. Id The agency argued that if Standard 208 were to go into effect it was "reasonably certain" that "the overwhelming majority of
new cars would [have been] equipped with automatic belts that are detachable," 46 Fed. Reg. at
53,421, and would be the functional equivalent of manual belts and would not lead to any significant increase in the usage of restraints. Id at 53,421, 53,423. The NHTSA concluded that the
costs of the requirement (approximately one billion dollars) were unreasonable and thus the requirements were "impracticable." Id. at 53,423. The agency also rejected the option of amending
the standard to require "use-inducing features" on automatic belts for several reasons. It rejected
this amendment for reasons of cost, the inequity of making current regular users of manual belts
pay for a system that was unnecessary for them (and subsidize current nonusers), the adverse
public and congressional reaction such a requirement would be expected to cause in light of the
"widespread, latent and irrational fear in many members of the public that they could be trapped
by the seat belt after a crash," and "compelling safety reasons." Id at 53,423, 53,424.
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tion,107 the appellate court found the rescission to be arbitrary and capricious. The court held that the appropriate standard of judicial
review under the Safety Act and the APA was the arbitrary and capricious test, rejecting the Sixth Circuit's conclusion in Chrysler Corp. P.
Department of Transportation that the Safety Act required application
08
of the "substantial evidence" standard.
The court of appeals observed that the appropriate scope of review
remains the most troublesome question in this case, however, because we are called upon to review the rescission rather than the promulgation of an agency rule. The scope of review in such a situation
appears to be a matter of first impression, even though judicial review of orders revoking a standard is specifically authorized by the
Safety Act and the APA. 109
The court noted the resemblance between rescission and an agency's
refusal to act, which is subject to only cursory judicial review, but ultimately it rejected such deferential review for rescissions. The court
said that two sources suggested the appropriate standard. First, the Pacffc Legal Foundation case had explained that "probing" review was
necessary where an agency has departed from a settled course of action. 10° Second, the court read the legislative reaction to the passive
restraint standard as one of support and believed any rescission of that
standard must be subject to searching and careful review."'
Under this intensified scope of review, the court reviewed the rescission and found it "arbitrary and illogical" for two reasons." 2 First,
because the agency offered "not one iota of evidence" that seatbelt usage would fail to increase as earlier studies had predicted, the NHTSA
' 3
had made "no showing that the standard is unjustified as written." "
The agency's finding that the standard should be rescinded due to
"substantial uncertainty" about increased usage rates turns the "ques107. 680 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1982), vacated& remandedsub nom. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983). For a good critical analysis of the Court
of Appeals decision, see Graham & Gorham, supra note 86.
108. 680 F.2d at 218-20 (rejecting Sixth Circuit's conclusion in Chrysler Corp. v. DOT, 472
F.2d 659, 668 (6th Cir. 1972) that the Safety Act's mandate that "all of the evidence before the
agency. . . shall be included in the record" invokes the substantial evidence test).
109. State Farm, 680 F.2d at 218.
110. 593 F.2d at 1343 (applying "thorough, probing, in-depth" review of Secretary Adams's
decision to issue Modified Standard 208 only four months after Secretary Coleman had decided
otherwise); see Joseph v. FCC, 404 F.2d 207, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1968)(sharp changes of course constitute "danger signals" to which a reviewing court must be alert); see also Greater Boston Television
Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir.)("Judicial vigilance . . . is particularly called upon
where . . . the Commission's policies are in flux."), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
111. State Farm, 680 F.2d at 222-28.
112. Id at 230.
113. Id at 230-31.
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NHTSA has some burden ... to show that a
tion on its head ....
regulation once considered to prevent deaths and injuries efficiently

can no longer be expected to do so."1t4
The second and more important reason why the majority of the
court"t5 found the rescission unlawful was because the "NHTSA has
failed to consider or analyze obvious alternatives to rescission, and has
thus artificially foreclosed attempts to further the purpose of the Safety
Act."" 6 Although the NHTSA did consider a few alternatives such as

changing the sequence of large car-small car compliance, it did not
devote "even a modicum of reasoned analysis to several far more obvious possible amendments to Modified Standard 208" 7-notably, re-

jecting detachable belts as a means of compliance," 8 reinstating
Secretary Coleman's demonstration project, 19 or adopting an airbags-

only standard. 2 0 The court acknowledged that the agency was not obligated to consider every alternative but insisted that it at least consider
2
and discuss some obvious alternatives.' '
The Court of Appeals concluded that
[o]n balance, it is difficult to find anything positive to say about
NHTSA's decisionmaking in this case [or] to avoid the conclusion
that NHTSA's analysis in Notice 25 has been distorted by solicitude
for the economically depressed automobile industry-which is not
the expense of consideration of traffic
the agency's mandate-at
22
safety, which is.'
Therefore the court vacated the rescission and remanded the case to the
NHTSA. 23 The Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Association and the
114. Id at 231.
115. Judge Edwards, who concurred in the decision, did not accept this second reason as a
basis for decision. Id at 242.
116. Id at 230.
117. Id at 233.
118. Id at 233-36.
119. Id at 238-39.
120. Id at 236-38. "If NHTSA's consideration of continuous belts was minimal, its analysis
of airbags was nonexistent." Id at 236.
121. The court stated that it was not holding that an agency could never rescind a safety
standard, but "rescission must be supported by rational explanations, after a reasoned and goodfaith effort to consider alternative means of advancing the agency's purpose." Id at 240.
122. Id at 239-40 (footnote omitted).
123. In the order of June 1, 1982, the court gave the NHTSA only 30 days in which to "submit
a schedule for resolving the questions raised in this opinion, leading either to the rescission or
suspension of the standard or to a judicially approved schedule for the effective implementation of
that standard or an amended standard." Id at 242. The court concluded that it "should not
simply remand this petition to the agency so that recalcitrance might succeed where rational decisionmaking might not. The implementation of a passive restraint standard has already been
delayed without acceptable reasons, perhaps unconscionably so." Id at 241. The agency subsequently submitted to the court a notice of proposed rulemaking, Docket No. 74-14, Notice 28,
FMVSS 208, and on August 4, 1982 the court issued an order staying the compliance date for the
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Solicitor General petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the appellate court's decision.
B. Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.. The Supreme Court Opinion.

The Supreme Court found, as had the Court of Appeals, that the
NHTSA's rescission of the passive restraint requirement was arbitrary
and capricious.1 24 The Court held that, under the language of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, which specifies that the review provisions of the
APA apply to "all orders establishing, amending, or revoking" an automobile safety standard, the rescission of a standard is subject to the
same test as the promulgation of such a standard-the arbitrary and
capricious standard as described in Overton Park. 25 The Court summarily rejected the claim of the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association (MVMA) that the proper standard to judge rescission was that
which a court would use to judge an agency's refusal to promulgate a
rule in the first place, which would be "close to the borderline of
nonreviewability.' t26 The Court noted that to accept this view would
"render meaningless the review provisions of the Safety Act.' 27 In
addition, the Court noted the substantial differences between revocation of an existing regulation and a failure to act at all. Rescission is a
reversal of the agency's former views on how best to carry out the policies committed to it by Congress and faces the "'presumption that
those policies will be carried out best if the settled rule is adhered to.'
...Accordingly, an agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is
passive restraint standard until September 1, 1983. In effect, the court reinstated Standard 208 but
postponed the compliance date. This action by the court of appeals in reinstating the standard
was one of the major issues in the petitioners' briefs to the Supreme Court. Car manufacturers
and the government contended that setting such implementation dates intruded upon agency authority and violated Vermont Yankee's injunction against imposing time constraints. Petitioner
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association (MVMA) Opening Brief at 45-48, and Brief for the
Federal Parties at 47-49, State Farm, 103 S.Ct. 2856 (1983). The respondents argued that the
court of appeals simply delayed the effective date of the standard, which, because it had not been
validly rescinded, was in effect and required installation of passive restraints after September 1,
1982. Brief of Respondent State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company at 44-49, State
Farm, 103 S.Ct. 2856. The Supreme Court, however, did not decide this issue because it held that
the agency had sufficient justification to suspend Standard 208 pending the further consideration
required by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. State Farm, 103 S.Ct at 2783 n.21.
124. The Chief Justice and Justices Rehnquist, Powell, and O'Connor dissented as to the finding that the decision to rescind the detachable belt portion of the Standard was arbitrary and
capricious but joined in the opinion on all other matters. State Farm, 103 S.Ct. at 2874-75 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
125. Id at 2865.
126. Id at 2856 (referring to brief of Petitioner MVMA).
127. State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2866.
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obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that
which may be required when an agency does not act in the first
12 8
instance."
The Court next turned to the court of appeals' use of congressional
acts and nonacts and held that the court had "erred in intensifying the
scope of its review based upon its reading of legislative events." 29 Although the Court concluded that it is difficult to infer congressional

support for passive restraints from inchoate legislative action such as

Congress's unwillingness to exercise its veto power, 130 it stated that in

any event the standard of review is not enlarged or diminished by subsequent congressional action.

31

Even an "unequivocal ratification" by

Congress would not connote disapproval of a later decision to rescind
the regulation.' 32 "That decision remains subject to the arbitrary and
133
capricious standard."'

Applying that standard, the Court dealt separately with the rescission as applied to airbags and to seatbelts. "The first and most obvious

reason for finding the rescission arbitrary and capricious is that
NHTSA apparently gave no consideration whatever to modifying the

Standard to require that airbag technology be utilized."' 134 Even if the
agency correctly concluded that detachable belts will not attain antici-

pated safety benefits, 35 this would only justify amending Standard 208
to disallow compliance by detachable belts, because the agency never
repudiated the efficacy of the airbag system. The Safety Act still re-

quired the agency to achieve traffic safety, and because the NHTSA did
not even consider whether airbags would advance that goal, the Court

rejected the agency's analysis as incomplete.

36

128. Id (footnote omitted)(quoting Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S.
800, 807-08 (1973)).
129. State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2867.
130. Id at 2868. The Court noted that the post-enactment legislative events could also be read
as showing congressional hostility to the restraints.
131. Id at 2867-68.
132. Id at 2868.
133. Id
134. Id
135. See infra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
136. State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2869.
[TIhe mandate of the Safety Act to achieve traffic safety would suggest that the logical
response to the faults of detachable seatbelts would be to require the installation of
airbags. At the very least this alternative way of achieving the objectives of the Act
should have been addressed and adequate reasons given for its abandonment. But the
agency not only did not require compliance through airbags, it did not even consider the
possibility in its 1981 rulemaking. . . . Because, as the Court of Appeals stated,
"NHTSA's. . . analysis of airbags was nonexistent,". . . what we said in Burlington
Truck Lines v. United States. . . is apropos here: "There are no findings and no analysis here to justify the choice made, no indication of the basis on which the [agency]
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The State Farm Court dispensed with two counterarguments con-

cerning the airbags-only option. First, just because the automobile industry opted for the passive belt, which the NHTSA considers

ineffective, this "hardly constitutes cause to revoke the standard itself.
Indeed, the Motor Vehicle Safety Act was necessary because the indus-

try was not sufficiently responsive to safety concerns."'

37

Second, the

Court rejected the contention that Vermont Yankee prevented the court

of appeals from requiring the agency to consider an airbags-only alternative because that would, in essence, be dictating to the agency the
procedures it was to follow. 138 The Court said such a contention misreads Vermont Yankee "as though it were a talisman under which any

agency decision is by definition unimpeachable"; in reality, Vermont
Yankee held only that courts could not impose additional procedural
requirements upon agencies.13 9 No court required the NHTSA to follow any specific procedures nor even required it to consider all policy

alternatives in reaching its decision. But because the NHTSA had previously decided that airbags met the mandate of the Safety Act, it could
not abandon that technology without reasoned analysis and
0

explanation. 14
The State Farm Court then turned to consideration of the rescis-

sion as it applied to seatbelts, which it admitted was a closer issue than
the airbags-only decision. 14 1 It held that this decision was also arbi-

trary and capricious, even though the Court agreed with petitioners'
contention that "just as an agency reasonably may decline to issue a
safety standard if it is uncertain about its efficacy, an agency may also
revoke a standard on the basis of serious uncertainties if supported by
exercised its expert discretion. We are not prepared to and the Administrative Procedure
Act will not permit us to accept such. . . practice."
Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167 (1962)).
137. State Farm, 103 S.Ct. at 2870. The Court noted that "for nearly a decade, the automobile industry waged the regulatory equivalent of war against the airbag and lost." Id (footnote
omitted).
138. Id
139. Id
140. "We hold only that given the judgment made in 1977 that airbags are an effective and
cost-beneficial life-saving technology, the mandatory passive-restraint rule may not be abandoned
without any consideration whatsoever of an airbags-only requirement." Id at 2871.
141. Id at 2871. Justice Rehnquist, in a dissenting opinion, disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that the NHTSA's view of detachable automatic seatbelts was arbitrary and capricious.
Id at 2874-75 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed to the agency's commitment to
increasing its educational efforts and to persuading the industry to develop automatic crash protection technology. Id at 2875. The dissenters also demonstrated a willingness to grant more
latitude to new administrations to give different weights to certain factors and thus come to different conclusions than their "counterparts in a previous administration." Id at 2875; see also infra
notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
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the record and reasonably explained."' 142 But the Court held that it is
not sufficient for "an agency to merely recite the terms 'substantial un-

certainty' as a justification for its actions.143 The agency must explain
the evidence that is available, and must offer a 'rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.' ",44 Because the NHTSA
did not explain why it proceeded with rescission without finding further evidence on seatbelt usage, its explanation was not sufficient to

persuade the Court that it was the product of reasoned decisionmaking.

45

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of ap-

peals and remanded the case to the court with directions to remand the
matter to NHTSA
analysis.

146

III.

for further consideration,

articulation,

and

IMPLICATIONS OF THE STATE FARM DECISION

The Court's decision in State Farm answered several questions,
including a number left open by Vermont Yankee, but it left some issues unresolved. This section analyzes the major implications of State

Farm-the validation of the hard look concept, the specification of
what aspects of "legislative history" courts may consider significant,

and the suggestion that courts' concern for ensuring that the "public
142. State Farm, 103 S.Ct. at 2871.
143. Id.
144. Id (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). Even
accepting the agency's judgment that the earlier field tests of passive restraints were inconclusive,
the Court found grounds to believe that usage would increase with detachable passive belts over
the present manual belt due to inertia. At the very least the NHTSA "must bring its expertise to
bear on the question," and while costs as well as benefits should be considered, the agency must
always keep in mind that "Congress intended safety to be the preeminent factor under the Motor
Vehicle Safety Act." State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2872-73.
145. "'An agency's view of what is in the public interest may change, either with or without a
change in circumstances. But an agency changing its course must supply a reasoned analysis."'
State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2874 (quoting Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841,
852 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971)).
146. State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2874. Roger B. Smith, Chairman of General Motors, urged the
Reagan Administration to delay any rulemaking on airbags until an independent study cleared up
the "massive misinformation" on the issue. He argued that "at least a decade must pass before
airbags or any other passive-restraint system could be standard equipment on virtually every car."
Washington Post, Aug. 30, 1983, at D7, col. 1.
In late 1983 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit considered the decision by the Secretary of Labor to reverse a longstanding policy against allowing
employment of workers in their home in the knitted outerwear industry by rescinding "homework" regulations. 46 Fed. Reg. 50,348 (1981). In International Ladies Garment Workers' Union
v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the court applied the arbitrary and capricious standard
as set forth in State Farm to find the rescission unlawful because the Secretary had failed to
provide a reasoned explanation of his rejection of alternatives, id at 815, and of his conclusion
that enforcement of fair labor standards would be feasible after homework restrictions were lifted.
Id at 818-26.
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interest" is heard in administrative decisionmaking may be proper.
This section then discusses several unresolved issues, including the extent of the holding, the necessity that an agency consider alternatives,
and the propriety of political intrusion in administrative
decisionmaking.
The most significant implication of State Farm is that it did not
add to the Vermont Yankee limitation on court-imposed procedures a
further limitation on court review of the substance of agency rules. Especially when read in light of Vermont Yankee, the Court's decision in
State Farm implies that federal courts may proceed with a hard look at
the substance of agency decisionmaking. As noted earlier,1 47 some
commentators and courts read the tenor of Vermont Yankee as a retreat
from close review of agency action.148 Others contend that the decision
was a limited procedural one or that it would not matter in any event
because the basis for the hard look doctrine extended beyond the APA
and because the hard look was too deeply engrained in the style of the
federal courts to be excised by one decision.149 With State Farm, the
"hard look" has been received into the core of judicial belief on how to
review administrative action. The State Farm decision is consistent
with the Overton Park and Camp opinions, which required federal
courts to go beyond a superficial review of agency reasoning. Apparently, the Supreme Court did not intend Vermont Yankee to be a retreat from that line of decisions which espoused a more detailed and
thorough examination of the factual bases of administrative actions,
but instead intended only to insert a procedural caveat into that reviewing process. Courts must demand from agencies careful assessment and
reasoned decisionmaking as well as an adequate response to reasonable
alternatives presented by challengers or to sensible arguments that arise
in the course of review.
A second implication of State Farm concerns reviewing courts' use
of legislative "history." The Supreme Court repudiated the court of
appeals' use of congressional reactions to the passive restraint standard.
The court of appeals interpreted scattered legislative acts and nonacts
as a commitment to passive restraints and heightened its review of the
NHTSA's actions as a result. The Supreme Court considered this
"misguided,"15 0 even if the court had correctly gauged Congress's senti147. See supra text accompanying notes 57-59
148. See, e.g., Verkuil, supra note 35, at 427.
149. See, e.g., Rodgers, supra note 44, at 708.
150. State Farm, 103 S.Ct. at 2867. As Graham & Gorham point out, the District of Columbia Circuit's view that Congress was highly supportive of Standard 208 is questionable. Graham &
Gorham, supra note 86, at 208-11.
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ments. The Court thus warned lower courts that congressional action,
short of statutory incorporation of agency decisions, subsequent to passage of the agency's enabling statute cannot be used by courts to infer a
mandate for or against a particular type of regulation and, therefore,
cannot be used to alter the standard of review. To rule otherwise, according to the Court, would violate established law, which holds that it
is the intent of the Congress that passes the act that is controlling, not
unenacted views of later Congresses. Such use of subsequent legislative "history" also approaches the limits of constitutionality by allowing Congress to "legislate" without meeting the constitutional
51
requirements for making laws.'
Coupled with the legislative veto decision of the same term, 5 2 this
holding in State Farm provides a strong indication to Congress that if it
wishes to direct or change administrative actions, it must do so by positive statutory action. The courts will not read into indirect actions a
directive to an agency nor allow Congress simply to negate agency action after it has delegated much policymaking power to the agency.
The Court also dealt with the issue of the "politics" of administrative behavior. Agencies are involved in politics in the sense that they
must balance the claims of competing private interests in much the
same way as an elected representative. 15 3 The majority in State Farm
seems, at times, to accept the view that an agency's policy emphasis
may shift due to changes in its political environment, 54 but commentators warn of the potential for agencies to become "captured" by the
interests that they serve or are supposed to regulate. i 55 The panel of
151. See Graham & Gorham, supra note 86, at 207-08.
152. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). For a discussion
of the implications of the case, see Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater?A Comment on the
Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789.
153. "Today, the exercise of agency discretion is inevitably seen as the essentially legislative
process of adjusting the competing claims of various private interests affected by agency policy....
The required balancing of policies is an inherently discretionary, ultimately political
procedure." Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669,
1683-84 (1975)(footnote omitted).
154. The Court noted that an agency's "'view of what is in the public interest may change,
either with or without a change in circumstances.'" State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2874 (quoting
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923

(1971)).
155. See, e.g., F.

HEFFRON & N. MCFEELEY, THE ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATORY PROCESS

147-65 (1983); B. OWEN & R. BRAEUTIGAM, THE REGULATION GAME: STRATEGIC USE OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 10 (1978). DeLong notes the results of a changing judicial perception
of agency behavior.
The phenomenon of capture has eroded the degree of automatic deference paid to oldstyle agencies. . . . [There] is the fear that the capture scenario will recur, that regulated
interests will gain control of an agency and either subvert the process or use it as a tool of
their own. . . . One perceptive political writer has characterized contemporary govern-
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the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
in State Farm held this view at least to a degree. The court noted that
the "NHTSA's analysis . . .has been distorted by solicitude for the

economically depressed automobile industry-which is not the
agency's mandate-at the expense of consideration of traffic safety,
which is." 156
Although the majority of the Supreme Court in State Farm accepted the notion that politics may legitimately affect agency actions, it
shared, at least to a limited extent, the perception that the automobile

industry had untoward influence in the NHTSA after 1980. It noted
that because Congress passed the Safety Act to force safety onto unwilling car manufacturers, the NHTSA's deferral to those manufacturers' wishes violated the congressional mandate. 157 The Court seems to

be saying that agencies' ability to respond to powerful political forces
in their regulatory environments is not unlimited, especially if those
forces are the regulated industries themselves. This is especially true

when it is not just private interests that are competing within the administrative arena, but private interests versus the larger public interest

in traffic safety. Administrative pluralism may work well in the first
situation when private interests battle on equal terms for agency favor;
but it does not work when the amorphous public interest goes undefended. Courts generally feel they must impose stricter standards of
review to ensure that the vague public interest does not go unheard, 15

at least in the area of safety regulation.
The Court also established the proper scope of review to be used

when an agency rescinds a rule. The petitioners in State Farm argued
that rescission is similar to refusal to promulgate a rule in the first place
and thus that judicial review should be similarly deferentialI 59 -indeed, "close to the borderline of nonreviewability."16 0 The Supreme
ment as "the special-interest state," in which groups of all sorts have gained control of
administrative units or portions of the annual budget and defended their turf ferociously.
DeLong, supra note 4, at 281 (footnotes omitted)(referring to Drew, Phase.- Engagemient with the
Special-Interest State, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 1978, at 64).
156. 680 F.2d at 240.
157. State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2870.
158. See, e.g., Central Florida Enters. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 49-51 (D.C. Cir. 1978)(where
agency has demonstrated undue bias toward private interests, presumption of agency regularity
rebutted), cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 957 (1979).
159. Petitioner's Opening Brief at 35-36, State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2856 (1983).
160. State Farm, 103 S.Ct. at 2866. For examples of judicial deference to refusal of agencies
to initiate action, see generally FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775,
796-97 (1978)(upholding FCC refusal to adopt rules even if no complete factual support in the
record); Southern Ry. v. ICC, 681 F.2d 29, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1982)(no power to review a discretionary
decision of the ICC not to suspend a tariff); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606
F.2d 1031, 1058-60 (D.C. Cir. 1979)(refusing to require SEC to adopt rules in light of uncertainty);
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Court expressly rejected that view and held that "an agency changing
its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis
for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency
does not act in the first instance."' 16' Thus rescission and promulgation
are both subject to the same scope of review under the arbitrary and
capricious standard.
The Court left open a number of questions regarding review of
rescissions. The Court noted that Section 103(b) of the Safety Act
states that the judicial review provisions of the APA " 'shall apply to all
orders establishing, amending, or revoking a Federal motor vehicle
safety standard.'"162 Thus, the Court's statement that any rescission
requires more justification than a refusal to initiate a rule may only be
dictum; its analysis may apply only when the applicable statute equates
rescissions with promulgations. Such a restricted view of the State
Farm opinion seems unwarranted, however, because the Court states
as a general proposition that the "revocation of an existing regulation is
substantially different than a failure to act," because revocation is a
16 3
departure from a settled course of behavior.
Arbitrary and capricious review, however, may not apply generally to rescission of a rule not yet in effect. In rescinding a proposed
rule, the agency is not always truly departing from a "settled course of
behavior" or a "settled rule" followed in numerous cases that has created strong expectations and changed behavior. Although the NHTSA
never finally committed itself to any passive restraint standard as a
means to carry out the statutory dictates of the Safety Act, it worked for
over a dozen years to develop standards demonstrating a settled course
of policy. Earlier rescissions of proposed actions should receive less
strict review. The government's argument that judicial review of rescissions should be highly deferential is much more reasonable when the
applicable statute is silent concerning the scope of review of rescissions
and when the agency has not expended much time and effort in
promulgating the rule in the first place.
Along with the scope of review, the Court considered the use of
"substantial uncertainty" as a justification for rescission. The Court
noted that "just as an agency reasonably may decline to issue a safety
Illinois v. NRC, 591 F.2d 12, 14-16 (7th Cir. 1979)(upholding NRC denial of request to institute
proceeding and hearing under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 because NRC's regulatory scheme

gives it broad responsibility as to how and when it should proceed); National Black Media Coalition v. FCC, 589 F.2d 578, 581-82 (D.C. Cir. 1978)(upholding FCC's failure to promulgate standards for use in comparative licensing proceedings because the decision was a policy judgment).
161. State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2866.
162. Id at 2865-66 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1392(b) (1982)).
163. State Farm, 103 S.Ct. at 2866.
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standard if it is uncertain about its efficacy, an agency may also revoke
a standard on the basis of serious uncertainties if supported by the record and reasonably explained."' 64 In State Farm, however, the Court
rejected the justification because the NHTSA could not make a rational
showing that serious uncertainties really did exist because it had not
considered the airbag option.
The Court touched on another issue-the necessity of considering
alternatives-without resolving it. The majority held that certain alternatives (airbags and nondetachable passive belts) must be considered.
Although these alternatives may be rejected later, the NHTSA must
demonstrate a reasoned consideration of those options and articulate
reasons if it rejects them. 65 Petitioners in State Farm advanced the
argument that Vermont Yankee prevents courts from requiring agencies
to consider alternatives because this would be, in essence, dictating to
agencies the procedures they must follow. t66 The Court dismissed this
contention because requiring consideration of airbags or belts imposes
on the NHTSA no specific procedures that it must follow.167
But the Court left unresolved the question of the limits of the
lower courts' ability to mandate consideration of further alternatives.
The Court conceded that it will not "broadly require an agency to consider all policy alternatives in reaching decision" and quoted its statement in Vermont Yankee that a rulemaking "cannot be found wanting
simply because the agency failed to include every alternative device
and thought conceivable by the mind of man . . regardless of how
uncommon or unkown that alternative may have been."' 6 Apparently, agencies need only consider those alternatives that were available
at the time of the decision and that were brought forward in the
rulemaking proceeding or previously analyzed and found to be worka164. Id at 2871. The Court left for a future case a discussion whether courts can ever require
agencies to initiate rulemaking proceedings or even can demand an explanation from agencies
that refuse to act. This may well be one of the more significant issues of the immediate future as
courts recognize the affirmative nature of agencies and citizens attempt to make agencies initiate
rulemaking, especially in an era of deregulation and under an administration that is hesitant to
encourage more government regulatory action. See Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programsand Private Rights, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1195, 1209-47 (1982); Note, JudicialReview afAdministrative Inaction, 83 COLtJM. L. REv.627, 628-45 (1983); see also Rockford League of Women Voters v. NRC,
679 F.2d 1218, 1222 (7th Cir. 1982)(upholding refusal of NRC to institute a proceeding to revoke
a construction permit for a nuclear plant on ground that courts should exercise extremely limited
scope of review of agency inaction because how an agency chooses to use its resources "calls for
managerial judgment"). See generally Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031,
1053-57 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
165. State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2868-74.
166. Petition for Writ of Certiorari by MVMA at 22-23, State Farm, 103 S.Ct. 2856 (1983).
167. State Farm, 103 S.Ct. at 2870-71.
168. Id at 2871 (quoting Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 551).
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ble and effective. But what of "obvious" alternatives that the agency
has not considered or at least discussed? Allowing a court to require
the agency to consider alternatives not previously brought forward
would risk delay of agency action and would place courts in the role of
the expert policymaker that agencies were designed to fill.
The final question that State Farm raises, which is related to the
issue discussed earlier of private interest administrative politics and
regulatory capture, 169 is the extent to which the Executive and electoral

politics can influence agency decisionmaking. It was not so much
"pressure" from the automobile manufacturers that led to the rescission
of the passive restraint standard as it was the "suggestions" and directives from the White House relating to President Reagan's goal of eliminating "unnecessary" and wasteful regulations that had an adverse
economic effect on American industry. Should the courts defer to
agency decisions "encouraged" by changes in administration?
The dissenters in State Farm would be more likely to accept such
politically motivated decisions. They not only recognize the role of executive oversight but applaud the idea that politics in the broader sense
may be a determining factor in an agency's decision to rescind a regulation advanced by a previous administration: "A change in administration brought about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly
reasonable basis for an executive agency's reappraisal of the costs and
'1 70
benefits of its programs and regulations."
The majority did not deal explicitly with the issue of executive
control, but vaguely worded congressional authorizations to agencies
demand that Presidents exercise some executive control of agency discretion. It is difficult for Congress to react to changes in the economic
or technical situation by rewriting legislation, whereas the President
does have the ability to respond. 17 ' In addition, the legitimacy of poli169. See supra text accompanying notes 153-58.
170. State Farm, 103 S.Ct. at 2875 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The agency's changed view of the standard seems to be related to the election of a new
President of a different political party. It is readily apparent that the responsible members of one administration may consider public resistance and uncertainties to be more
important than do their counterparts in a previous administration. . . . As long as the
agency remains within the bounds established by Congress, it is entitled to assess administrative records and evaluate priorities in light of the philosophy of the administration.
Id at 2875 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). "Of course, a new administration may not choose not to

enforce laws of which it does not approve, or to ignore statutory standards in carrying out its
regulatory functions." Id at 2875 n.* (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
171. E.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 406 (D.C. Cir. 198 1)(footnotes omitted), rev'd,
103 S.Ct. 3274 (1983):
The authority of the President to control and supervise executive policymaking is derived from the Constitution; the desirability of such control is demonstrable from the
practical realities of administrative rulemaking. Regulations such as those involved here
demand a careful weighing of cost, environmental, and energy considerations. They also
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cymaking by unelected administrators depends upon the control of
those administrators by the public, acting through the only nationally
elected official-the President. In State Farm, however, the factor of
executive directives to the NHTSA apparently carried little weight in
the majority's consideration.
IV.

CONCLUSION

State Farm is an important case that suggests some answers and
leaves some questions. It is the Supreme Court's first opinion that considers the scope of review for a rescission of a rule. Because the enabling statute in State Farm dealt with the issue, it remains unclear
whether rescissions of standards lacking a "settled course of behavior"
are subject to the same scope of review. Also unclear is the extent to
which the federal courts may demand that agencies take into account
alternatives apparent to the courts and whether failure to do so will
always constitute a lack of reasoned decisionmaking. The Court left for
another case the major issue of whether the public and the courts can
ever force agencies to initiate rulemaking proceedings.
State Farm does answer several questions. It warns the federal
courts not to alter the intensity of judicial review based on a reading of
congressional commitment to a policy if that reading is derived from
unenacted legislative "intent." It warns the agencies that, at least
where public safety is concerned, they may not consider regulated parties' well-being more important than the public interest. Most importantly, the decision in State Farm resurrects Overton Park's directive
that courts must engage in a "thorough, probing, in-depth review" of
the agency decisionmaking process. The Supreme Court informs us
that Vermont Yankee stands as a procedural and not a substantive limitation and that "hard look" review is legitimate.
Neil D. McFeeley

have broad implications for national economic policy. Our form of government simply
could not function effectively or rationally if key executive policymakers were isolated
from each other and from the Chief Executive. Single mission agencies do not always
have the answers to complex regulatory problems.

